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I. Introduction 
 
One of the strengths of the American higher education system is its competitive 
nature. Colleges and universities compete for faculty, for students, for external research 
funding and on the athletic fields. Given the wide publicity that the U.S. News & World 
Reports annual rankings of colleges and universities receives and the importance of 
student selectivity in these rankings, increasingly American colleges and universities are 
using merit aid as a vehicle to attract higher test score students and to improve their 
rankings.1   
It is well-known that test scores are correlated with students’ socio-economic 
backgrounds. Hence to the extent that colleges are successful in “buying” higher test 
score students, one should expect that their enrollment of students from families in the 
lower tails of the family income distribution should decline. However, somewhat 
surprisingly, there have been no efforts to test if this is occurring. 
Our paper presents such a test. While institutional level data on the dollar amounts of 
merit scholarships offered by colleges and universities are not available, data are 
available on the number of National Merit Scholarship (henceforth NMS) winners 
attending an institution on scholarships that have been funded by the institution itself, 
rather than the National Merit Scholarship Corporation (henceforth NMSC). These 
institutional scholarships are awarded to high test score students only if they attend the 
institution. Our research strategy is to estimate if an increase in the number of recipients 
of these scholarships at an institution is associated with a decline in the number of 
students from lower and lower middle income families attending the institution, other 
                                                 
1See, for example, Michael S. McPherson and Morton O. Schapiro (1998, 2002), Elizabeth A. Duffy and 
Idana Goldberg (1998) and Ronald G. Ehrenberg (forthcoming) 
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factors held constant. We measure the number of these students by the number of Pell 
Grant recipients attending the institution. 
Section II of our paper briefly describes the National Merit Scholarship and the 
federal Pell Grant programs.  In section III, we describe our analytical approach and 
section IV presents our empirical findings. Section V provides some brief concluding 
remarks. 
II. The National Merit Scholarship and Pell Grant Programs2 
The National Merit Scholarship Program began in 1955.  High school students 
qualify for awards based upon their scores on the PSAT examination, high school 
records, letters of recommendation, information about the students’ activities and 
leadership, and personal essays.  
Three types of NMS awards exist.  The first is a set of scholarships awarded to top 
students independent of family financial circumstances by the NMSC itself; these awards 
currently are $2,500 scholarships for one year of college and winners are free to choose 
the institution that they wish to attend. The second is a set of scholarships awarded by 
corporations to top students who are employees of the corporations, children of 
employees, residents of a community in which the corporations have operations, or 
students pursuing college majors or careers in which the corporations have a special 
interest. These scholarships may be for one year of study or renewable for four years. 
Again there is no restriction on the college or university that the student may attend. 
The final type, and the focus of our attention, is the NMS awards sponsored by 
colleges and universities. Finalists in the NMS competition notify the NMSC of their first 
choice college or university and the NSMC in turn notifies the institution. Each institution 
                                                 
2 A more detailed discussion of the NMS program is found at www.nationalmerit.org . 
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that offers this type of award makes awards to a subset of the finalists that have indicated 
that they wish to attend the institution. Crucially, an award is cancelled if the student 
decides not to attend the institution. Hence, these awards are contingent on attending the 
institution. 
These college and university sponsored awards are renewable for up to four years of 
undergraduate study and provide stipends that range from $500 to $2,000 a year. Awards 
of this amount pale when compared to the $30,000 tuition and fee levels that are now 
common at the nation’s most selective private colleges and universities. However, 
previous research has indicated that offering a top student a named scholarship enhances 
the likelihood that a student will attend an institution.3 In addition, it is likely that 
institutions that offer NMS awards offer additional merit aid to students and hence that 
the dollar amount of the NMS awards likely understates the amount of merit aid that the 
recipients receive from the institution. 
Table 1 provides information on the total number of NMS awards and the number of 
these awards sponsored by colleges and universities for selected academic years between 
1983 and 2003.4 The total number of NMS awards grew from 5,566 in 1983 to 8,244 in 
2003. As the third column indicates the percentage of these awards sponsored by colleges 
and universities increased from 42.8% in 1983 to 56.5% in 1995 and has remained at 
about that percentage since then.  
NMS awards are heavily concentrated among a small number of our nation’s over 
3,500 colleges and universities. Our econometric research will involve analyzing panel 
data for the 100 colleges and universities that had the most new NMS winners attending 
                                                 
3 Christopher Avery and Caroline Hoxby (2004) 
4 These data were provided to the authors by the National Merit Scholarship Corporation.  
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them in 2003.  The names of the institutions and their number of NMS winners in 2003 
appear in the appendix.5
 These top 100 institutions enrolled about 84% of all of the NMS winners in 2003 
with somewhat lower percentages in the earlier years.6 Many of these institutions are 
among the small number of colleges and universities that still pursue need blind 
admissions and need-based financial aid policies and a number of them accordingly offer 
no college and university sponsored NMS awards. However, even in this group of 100 
institutions, the percentage of NMS awards that were sponsored by the institutions 
themselves rose from 41.5% in 1983 to about 55.5% at the turn of the 21st century.  
Table 2 provide information for each year during our sample period on the numbers 
of institution sponsored and non-institution sponsored NMS students at these institutions 
at the 25th percentile, 50th percentile (median), 75th percentile and mean institution in our 
top 100 sample. The total number of NMS students increases at each point in the 
distribution; this increase is at least partially due to the way the institutions were selected 
(top 100 in 2003). What stands out, however, is that virtually all of the growth in the 
number of NMS winners occurred in the institution sponsored category. For example, the 
mean number of institutional sponsored awards in the sample rose from 17 in 1983 to 37 
in 2003. As late as 1995-96, the 25th percentile institution (in terms of total number of 
NMS awards in 2003) offered no institutional sponsored NMS awards. By 2003-2004, 
however, the 25th percentile institution in the group offered 12 institutionally sponsored 
NMS awards. 
                                                 
5 There actually are 103 institutions in the sample because of a tie for 100th place. 
6 The lower enrollment shares in earlier years are an artifact of the way the panel was constructed. This 
occurs because there is some variation in the institutions that appear in the top 100 list from year to year. 
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Our interest is in how the growth of merit scholarships has influenced the proportion 
of students from lower and lower middle income families attending selective institutions. 
While institutional level data on the family income distribution of students are not 
collected by the U.S. Department of Education, data on the number of Pell Grant 
recipients at each institution are collected annually. 
 The Pell Grant program is the largest need-based financial aid program, in the United 
States; it provided about $12.6 billion dollars in funding to 5.1 million undergraduate 
students in 2003-2004.7 Eligibility for Pell Grants for a dependent student is based upon a 
dependent student’s family income and wealth, the number of siblings in college and the 
expected costs of attending the institution; for independent students eligibility is based 
upon the income of the student and his or her spouse.8 Prior to 1993, awards were also 
constrained to be less than 60% of the costs of attending an institution; some students 
who attended low-cost institutions were excluded from participating in the Pell Grant 
program for this reason. 
Data from the 2002-2003 Title IV/Federal Pell Grant Program End-of-Year Report 
indicate that in that year 87% of all Pell Grant recipients at 4-year public institutions 
came from families with family incomes of $40,000 or less; the comparable figure at 4-
year private institutions was 86.6%.9 Hence the share of Pell Grant recipients among an 
institution’s undergraduate student body is a good proxy for the share of its students 
coming from lower and lower middle income families.10  
                                                 
7 Trends in Student Aid 2004 (2004), tables 1 and 3 
8 Seftor and Turner (2002) indicate that throughout the 1990s, over one-half of Pell Grant recipients were 
independent students, although this fraction is likely to be much lower in the selective institutions that are 
in our sample where most students are full-time students  
9 2002-2003 Title IV/Federal Pell Grant Program End-of-Year Report, Table 2A 
10 Tebbs and Turner (2004) caution that the Pell Grant recipient data refer to students attending an 
institution anytime during a year, while IPEDs enrollment data refer to a point of time in the fall. Hence, 
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Table 3 presents information, by year, on the mean ratio of the number of Pell Grant 
recipients at an institution to the number of full-time undergraduates attending the 
institution for the 100 institutions in our sample during the 1983 to 2000 period. The 
column headed “unweighted” presents information on the average percentage across 
institution, while the column headed “weighted” is a weighted average, with the 
enrollments used as weights. These data suggest that the percentage of Pell Grant 
recipients among the undergraduate students at these institutions fluctuated, but gradually 
increased during the period. 11
This increase tells us little about the impact of the growth of institutionally funded 
NMS at these institutions on the number of Pell Grant recipients at the institutions during 
the period; the share of Pell Grant recipients at these institutions will vary over time as 
the income distribution of the populations changes, as eligibility rules change, as 
maximum award levels change and as tuition levels at the institutions change. Hence to 
analyze the impact of changes in the number of NMS recipients on the number of Pell 
Grant recipients, we must control for these other factors in our analyses 
III. Analytic Approach 
Our goal is to see how the number of institutionally financed new NMS winners (Mt) 
at an institution influence the number of Pell Grant recipients (Pt) at the institution, other 
                                                                                                                                                 
other factors held constant, if turnover of students is high at an institution during the year, this will 
artificially make the “share” of Pell Grant recipients at the institution appear to be high. We control for this 
in the empirical work that follows by including institutional fixed effects in our estimation methods.  
11 We caution the reader that part-time students attending at least half-time are eligible for Pell Grants. 
However, the 2002-2003 Title IV/Federal Pell Grant Program End-of-Year Report (table 13) indicates that 
86.9% of the Pell Grant recipients attending public 4-year institutions and 87.8% of the Pell Grant 
recipients attending private 4-year institutions were full-time students that year  For the institutions in our 
sample, part-time students represent only 12.6 percent of all students and using total undergraduate students 
in the denominator of our ratio does not change the trends reported above or any of the econometric results 
that follow. We also should caution that only U.S. Citizens and permanent residents are eligible for Pell 
Grants. Thus if an institution enrolls a high fraction of foreign students, its Pell Grant ratio will, other 
factors held constant, appear to be low. 
 6
factors held constant). A problem that immediately presents itself is that the number of 
NMS winners refers to entering first-year students, while the number of Pell Grant 
recipients refers to all enrolled undergraduates. If we had data on the number of Pell 
Grant recipients that were first-year students at an institution, we would use this 
information and information on the number of new first-year students at the institution to 
construct the fraction of first-year students that were Pell Grant recipients at the 
institution and then estimate how changes in the number of NMS winners affects that 
ratio. However, Pell Grant data is not available at the institutional level by the year that 
the student is enrolled in college. 
A solution to this problem is possible if we make some very strong and admittedly 
unrealistic assumptions. Specifically, if one is willing to assume for simplicity that all 
students at the institution enter as first-year students, that no students drop out before 
graduation, that students’ Pell Grant eligibility does not change during the years that they 
are enrolled in college and that all students who graduate do so in four years, then the 
following relationship holds 
(1)  Pit = pit + pit-1 + pit-2 + pit-3. 
Here pit is the number of new first-year Pell Grant recipients that enroll at the 
institution in year t. Put simply, the total number of Pell Grant recipients at the institution 
in year t is the sum of the number of new first-year Pell grant recipients that enrolled at 
the institution in year t and in each of the three preceding years. If one writes down the 
equivalent expression for Pit-1 and then subtracts this from Pit, one finds that 
(2)  Pit – Pit-1 = pit – pit-4. 
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Given the assumptions that we have made, the difference between the number of 
Pell Grant recipients at an institution in year t and year t-1 is the difference between the 
numbers of first-year Pell Grant recipients in year t and year t-4. Hence if we want to 
estimate how changes in the number of NMS influence changes in the number of Pell 
Grant recipients at the institution between years t and t-1, the correct change in the 
number of NMS winners to use is the difference between Mt and Mt-4 . So the dependent 
variable in our econometric analyses will be based upon one year changes in the numbers 
of Pell Grant recipients, while our explanatory variable will be based upon four year 
changes in the number of institutionally funded NMS winners. 
Our empirical approach is to use our institutional level panel data to estimate 
equations in which the one year change in the ratio of the number of Pell Grant recipients 
to the number of full-time undergraduate students at an institutions is specified to be a 
linear function of the four year change in the share of first-year full-time undergraduate 
students that receive institutionally financed NMS awards at the institution, institutional 
fixed effects, year fixed effects, and a random error term.  
(3) (Pit/Fit) – (Pit-1/Fit-1) = a0 + a1 ((Mit/Nit) – (Mit-4/Nit-4)) + ui + vt + eit 
Here Fit is the number of full-time enrolled undergraduates at institution i in year 
t, Nit is the number of full-time first-year students enrolled at institution i in year t, the aj  
are parameters,  the ui are the institutional fixed effects, the vt are the year fixed effects 
and the eit is a random error term. The institutional fixed effects are included in the model 
to control for institution specific factors other than changes in the number of NMS award 
winners that might affect the change in the share of Pell Grant recipients at an institution. 
The year fixed effects are included to control for changes in national factors that might 
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affect the share of Pell Grant recipients over time; these factors include changes in the 
distribution of family income of college-age students, changes in Pell Grant eligibility 
and generosity rules, and changes in Pell Grant funding levels.  
The Pell Grant and NMS variables have each been deflated by a relevant size 
variable (total full-time undergraduate students or total full-time first year students) to 
control for changes in the size of each institution over time. Because part-time students 
enrolled for at least one-half of a normal full-time load are eligible to receive Pell Grants, 
in the empirical work in the next section, we also experiment with deflating the Pell grant 
and NMS variables by the total number of undergraduate students and the total number of 
first-year students at the institution. 
Finally, we should note that our use of the one year change in the number of Pell 
Grant recipients at institution to measure the four year change in the number of freshman 
Pell Grant recipients at an institution is likely to be subject to substantial measurement 
error because of the set of strict assumptions that we had to make to derive this 
equivalence. However, if the measurement error is random, it will serve only to increase 
the imprecision of our estimates; it will not bias the coefficient of the NMS variable. 
IV. Empirical Findings 
Table 4 summarizes our initial estimates of equation (3). The coefficients in the table 
are estimates of the parameter a1 that come from four different model specifications. The 
first is based upon the total number of new NMS recipients at an institution, regardless of 
the source of funding. The second is based upon the number of institutionally funded 
NMS recipients. The third is based upon the number of NMS recipients at the institution 
that are not funded by the institution. The final specification includes both the number of 
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institutionally funded NMS and the number of NMS recipients funded in other ways as 
explanatory variables. For each specification, we present estimated coefficients for 
models that excluded and included year fixed effects; the estimates are not very sensitive 
to these variables. The panel used in this estimation makes use of four years of NMS 
recipient data – 1983, 1987, 1991 and 1995, so we have three change observations for 
each institution in the sample.12
 The coefficients in row 1 suggest that increasing the ratio of new NMS award 
winners, irrespective of source of funding, at an institution to the size of the institution’s 
first-year full-time student body reduces the ratio of the institution’s number of Pell Grant 
recipients to its full-time undergraduate enrollments. If the sizes of the institution’s first-
year full-time student body and its full-time undergraduate enrollments remain constant, 
the interpretation of the coefficients are that an increase in NMS awards of ten at an 
institution is associated with a reduction in the number of Pell Grant recipients at the 
institution of about two. 
When we restrict our attention to the number of institutional awarded NMS, the 
magnitude of the reduction is doubled to a reduction of four Pell Grant recipients for 
every ten additional institutionally funded NMS award winners, again holding constant 
full-time freshman and full-time total undergraduate enrollment levels. Indeed, when we 
restrict our attention to NMS winners not funded by the institution in row 3, an increase in 
the number of these winners at an institution has no statistically significant effect on the 
number of Pell Grant recipients at the institution. This finding is confirmed in the 
                                                 
12 The 2003 data could not be used because IPEDs data are not yet available for full-time first year students 
and total full time undergraduate enrollment for 2002 or 2003. We exclude the 1999 data because IPED 
enrollment data were not collected for that year. However, we report below our efforts to include data for 
1999 by using the average of the institution’s enrollment in 1998 and 2000 as a proxy for its 1999 
enrollment level. 
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coefficients from the last model (row 4); when both the number of institutionally 
financed and other NMS award recipients are included as explanatory variables only 
increases in the former have a negative effect on the number of Pell Grant recipients at 
the institution. Put simply, in our sample of institutions, other factors held constant 
including the total full-time undergraduate and first-year enrollment levels, offering more 
institutionally funded NMS awards is associated with fewer Pell Grant recipients 
attending the institution and the magnitude of the reduction is roughly four less Pell Grant 
recipients for each ten additional institutional NMS recipients enrolled at the institution. 
 Table 5 presents estimates of coefficients from the models in table 4 that included 
year fixed effects, in which the models were estimated for various subgroups of our 
sample. In particular, we present estimates for the entire sample (the same as in table 4), 
for the top 80 institutions in terms of the number of Pell Grant recipients in 2003, for the 
top 60 institutions, for the top 40 institutions, for the top 20 institutions and for the top 10 
institutions. These analyses confirm that only the institutionally financed and awarded 
NMS adversely influence the number of Pell Grant recipients at an institution. However, 
the magnitude of this displacement effect varies across institution. In particular, the 
magnitude of the displacement effect increases as we move from the top 100 institutions, 
to the top 80, down to the top 10 (in terms of total number of Pell Grant recipients in 
2003). It is at the institutions with the largest number of Pell Grant recipients that the 
displacement of Pell Grant recipients by institutionally funded NMS recipients is the 
largest. Indeed, we cannot reject the hypothesis that, other factors held constant, at the top 
10 institutions, every additional institutionally financed NMS recipient that attends the 
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institution is associated with a reduction of one Pell Grant recipient attending the 
institution.13  
 Several extensions of our analyses warrant brief mention. First, we replicated the 
analyses found in table 5 separately for public and private institutions. The pattern of 
displacement effects for the privates was very similar to those for the entire sample; the 
coefficients of the institutional NMS variable were indistinguishable for each subgroup 
between private institutions and for the overall sample (reported in table 5). In contrast, 
the displacement effects of increasing institutional NMS awards at public institutions 
were not significantly different from zero when we used the top 80 and top 100 samples. 
This says that at those public institutions which lie below number 60 in terms of total 
NMS recipients in 2003, we find no evidence of a displacement of Pell Grant recipients 
by institutionally funded NMS recipients. 
 Second, we replicated the analyses found in table 5, adding data for 1999 to the 
sample. Because 1999 enrollment data was not collected by IPEDs, this required us to 
estimate the 1999 number of full-time first year students for each institution by the 
average of the 1998 and 2000 values of this variable for each institution. We found that 
even with the measurement error that is induced by doing this, our estimates of the 
displacement effects of increasing the number of institutionally sponsored NMS recipients 
at an institution on the number of Pell Grant recipients at the institution were roughly of 
the same order of magnitude as those found in table 5. 
 Third, part-time students attending an institution at least half-time are eligible to 
receive Pell Grants. While we do not know the number of part-time students at each 
                                                 
13 Four of the top 10 institutions are selective private universities that have no institutionally financed NMS 
recipients. Four of the other six are flagship public universities (appendix table A) 
 12
institution each year that meet this criteria, we experimented with either including part-
time students in the total enrollment figures that are in the denominator of the dependent 
variable in equation (3), including part-time first-year students in the total first-year 
enrollment figure that is in the denominator of the explanatory variables in equation (3), 
or doing both simultaneously. None of these changes substantially affected the findings 
that we have reported so far. 
 Finally, we divided our sample into institutions that experienced increases in total 
full-time enrollments during both the 1987-1991 and 1991-1995 periods and all other 
institutions. We estimated variants of the models that underlie table 4 for both groups. 
We found that a strong statistically significant negative relationship exists between the 
change in the ratio of institutionally awarded NMS to the number of full-time first-year 
students and the change in the ratio of the number of Pell Grant recipients to the total 
full-time undergraduates enrolled at the institution existed only at the “growing” 
institutions.  Thus, the displacement of Pell Grant recipients by institutionally awarded 
NMS recipients in our sample appears to occur only at institutions with growing 
enrollments and largely reflects a change in the share of Pell Grant recipients in the 
student body, not always an absolute decline in the number of Pell grant recipients. 
V. Concluding Remarks 
Our study has provided the evidence that, other factors held constant, an increase in 
the share of institutionally funded NMS students in a college or university’s first-year 
class is associated with a reduction in the share of Pell Grant recipients among the 
undergraduate student body at the institution. The magnitude of this displacement effect 
is largest at the institutions in our sample that enroll the greatest number of NMS students 
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and it occurs primarily in institutions whose enrollment is growing.  We stress that we 
have observed this displacement effect, as we expected, only for institutionally sponsored 
NMS; we do not observe any displacement of Pell Grant recipients if an institution is able 
to increase the number of NMSC or company sponsored recipients that it enrolls. Those 
NMS winners, who receive their awards regardless of at which institution they choose to 
enroll, do not appear to displace any student from lower-income families when they 
enroll at an institution. 
While our research has focused only on NMS awards, it highlights the tradeoff that 
may exist more broadly between using institutional grant aid to craft a more selective 
student body than would otherwise occur and using institutional grant aid to attract more 
students from families from the lower tail of the family income distribution. If selective 
institutions, especially public ones, are committed to serving students from all 
socioeconomic backgrounds, these institutions must track the share of their students that 
receive Pell grants and focus on socioeconomic diversity as well as on student selectivity 
as goals. Absent concerted efforts by these institutions to increase the representation of 
students from lower and lower middle income families in their student ranks, current 
inequalities in the distribution of students attending these institutions by family income 
class are likely to persist or worsen over time.14
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 William G. Bowen, Martin A Kurzweil and Eugene M. Pichler (2005) 
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                                                            Table 1 
       Number of Total and Institution-Sponsored National Merit Scholarship  
                                                          Studentsa 
 
 All Institutions Top 100 Institutionsb
year 
Total  Institution 
sponsored
percentage 
institution 
sponsored
Total Institution 
sponsored 
percentage 
institution 
sponsored
1983 5566 2,382 42.8  4330 1796 41.5
1987 6127 2,976 48.6  4844 2214 45.7
1991 6552 3,463 52.9  4982 2489 50.0
1995 7030 3,975 56.5  5496 2951 53.7
1999 8081 4,582 56.7  6594 3660 55.5
2003 8254 4,670 56.6  6965 3856 55.4
 
a Data on the number of National Merit Scholarship students by institution are provided by the 
National Merit Scholarship Corporation. A complete list of these institutions was made available 
to us for 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, and 2003. The Chronicle of Higher 
Education publishes the top X institutions (where X varies across years from 30 to 100) that 
enroll the most National Merit Scholarship students in many years. Because of the changing 
coverage, we have not used the Chronicle’s data. 
 
b The top 100 institutions are determined by the total number of merit NMS students in an 
institution in 2003; these institutions are not necessarily the top 100 in earlier years. These 
institutions enroll about 80% of all NMS (ranging from 78% in 1983 to 84% in 2003). 
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                                                                   Table 2 
              Distribution of National Merit Scholarship Students at the Top 100  
                                   Institutions: By Source of Sponsorship 
 
 All  Institution Sponsored  Non-institution Sponsored 
year 25th 50th 75th mean 25th 50th 75th mean 25th 50th 75th mean
198384 12 24 47 42  0 5 20 17  5 10 29 25
198788 20 30 52 47  0 14 26 21  5 9 29 26
199192 20 32 55 48  0 16 34 24  6 12 24 24
199596 23 36 57 53  0 20 36 29  5 12 23 25
199900 28 41 85 64  6 25 41 36  6 15 31 28
200304 29 44 77 68  12 26 40 37  7 14 33 30
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                                   Table 3 
Percentage of Full-Time Undergraduate Students  
That are Pell Grant Recipients at the Top 100 Institutionsa 
                    (as defined in table 1) 
 
year Unweighted  Weighted
1983 18.60 21.16
1984 18.32 21.02
1985 18.23 21.12
1986 15.94 18.67
1987 16.58 19.77
1988 19.50 23.14
1989 19.75 23.42
1990 19.34 23.21
1991 21.30 25.56
1992 22.64 27.32
1993 21.98 25.89
1994 22.05 26.01
1995 21.71 25.60
1996 21.72 25.75
1997 21.72 25.79
1998 21.95 26.24
1999b 20.05 23.97
2000 19.22 23.19
 
a The Pell Grant data are from the Federal Pell Grant Program administrated by the 
Department of Education. We received data from the Department of Education for 
academic years 1983-84 to 2003-04 on the number of students receiving Pell Grants and 
total amount of Pell Grants received at each Title IV institution each year during the 
period.  Data on the number of full-time undergraduates enrolled at each institution and 
the number of full-time first-time freshman at each institution are from Webcaspar 
(http://caspar.nsf.gov). The percentage of Pell Grant recipients at an institution in a year 
is 100 times the number of Pell Grant recipients at the institution in the year divided by 
the number of full-time undergraduates enrolled at the institution in a year. 
 
b Enrollment data were not provided by Webcaspar for 1999, so we used the average of 
the 1998 and 1999 figures for that year. 
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                                                             Table 4 
Estimates of the Impact of a Change in the Share of Freshman at an Institution that 
are National Merit Scholarship Winners on the Change in the Share of 
Undergraduates at the Institution that Receive Pell Grants: Fixed Effects Models 
                                                     (t statistics) 
 
 
Share of Pell Grant Recipients 
Pellt -Pellt-1
  
(1)Share of Total Meritt - Meritt-4 -0.200 (-2.35)  -0.171 (-2.16) 
      
(2)Share of Inst.  Meritt - Meritt-4 -0.415 (-3.16)  -0.409 (-3.38) 
      
(3)Share of Non-inst. Meritt - Meritt-4 -0.070 (-0.52)  -0.004 (-0.03) 
      
(4)Share of Inst.  Meritt - Meritt-4 -0.418 (-3.12)  -0.427 (-3.44) 
    Share of Non-inst. Meritt - Meritt-4 0.018 (0.14)  0.086 (0.69) 
   
Year Fixed Effects Included No  Yes 
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                                                             Table 5 
Estimates of the Impact of a Change in the Share of Freshman at an Institution that 
are National Merit Scholarship Winners on the Change in the Share of 
Undergraduates at the Institution that Receive Pell Grants: Fixed Effects Models  
                             Estimated Separately For Different Samplesa 
                                                                              (t statistics)              
 
 
Share of Pell Grant Recipients 
Pellt -Pellt-1 
 
 Top 100  Top 80  Top 60 
   
(1)Share of Total Meritt - Meritt-4 -0.171 (-2.16) -0.176 (-1.91)  -0.172 (-1.63)
         
(2)Share of Inst.  Meritt - Meritt-4 -0.409 (-3.38) -0.420 (-3.00)  -0.436 (-2.69)
         
(3)Share of Non-inst. Meritt - 
Meritt-4 -0.004 (-0.03) -0.001 (-0.01)  0.012 (0.07) 
         
(4)Share of Inst.  Meritt - Meritt-4 -0.427 (-3.44) -0.442 (-3.08)  -0.465 (-2.78)
 Share of Non-inst. Meritt - Meritt-4 0.086 (0.69) 0.102 (0.69)  0.122 (0.73) 
   
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes   Yes
 
 
 
 
Share of Pell Grant Recipients: 
 Pellt -Pellt-1 
 
 Top 40  Top 20  Top 10 
   
(1)Share of Total Meritt - Meritt-4 -0.288 (-2.50)  -0.397 (-2.14)  -0.699 (-2.74)
         
(2)Share of Inst.  Meritt - Meritt-4 -0.551 (-3.25)  -0.824 (-2.93)  -1.471 (-4.06)
         
(3)Share of Non-inst. Meritt - 
Meritt-4 -0.130 (-0.65)  -0.209 (-0.62)  -0.392 (-0.85)
         
(4)Share of Inst.  Meritt - Meritt-4 -0.558 (-3.16)  -0.867 (-2.84)  -1.465 (-3.77)
Share of Non-inst. Meritt - Meritt-4 0.031 (0.16)  0.129 (0.39)  -0.020 (-0.06)
    
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes   Yes
 
a Using panel data for 1983, 1987, 1991 and 1995 
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                                                       Appendix                
           Colleges and Universities with the Most Freshman NMS in 2003 
 
 
Rank Institution Total NMS
Sponsored by 
Institution 
1 Harvard University 378 0 
2 University of Texas at Austin 258 201 
3 Yale University 228 0 
4 University of Florida 224 185 
5 Stanford University 217 0 
6 University of Chicago 182 148 
7 Arizona State University 176 153 
8 Rice University 173 102 
9 University of Oklahoma 170 146 
10 Princeton University 165 0 
11 Washington University in St. Louis 162 125 
12 University of Southern California 161 132 
13 Massachusetts Inst. of Technology 151 0 
14 University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 143 117 
14 Vanderbilt University 143 103 
16 Brigham Young University 140 97 
17 Texas A&M University 137 103 
18 New York University 136 115 
19 University of California at Los Angeles 125 94 
20 Duke University 103 0 
21 University of Pennsylvania 101 0 
22 Northwestern University 96 53 
23 Ohio State University 93 77 
23 Purdue University 93 75 
25 Carleton College 79 62 
26 Georgia Institute of Technology 77 62 
27 University of Georgia 75 59 
28 Iowa State University 69 55 
29 University of California at Berkeley 67 0 
30 Michigan State University 60 46 
31 University of Arizona 59 47 
31 University of Michigan at Ann Arbor 59 0 
33 University of California at San Diego 56 38 
34 Boston University 54 39 
35 Case Western Reserve University 53 28 
36 University of Nebraska at Lincoln 52 40 
37 Macalaster College 51 48 
38 California Institute of Technology 50 0 
38 University of Kansas 50 40 
40 Johns Hopkins University 49 32 
40 University of Tulsa 49 38 
40 University of Maryland at College Park 49 34 
43 Brown University 47 0 
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43 Columbia University  47 0 
45 Oberlin College  46 38 
45 Tulane University 46 36 
47 Dartmouth College 45 0 
47 University of Kentucky 45 33 
47 University of South Carolina at Columbia 45 34 
47 Wheaton College (Ill.) 45 40 
51 University of Notre Dame 44 0 
51 University of Washington 44 26 
53 Harvey Mudd College 43 32 
54 Kenyon College 41 33 
54 Tufts University 41 37 
56 Baylor University 40 31 
56 Grinnell College 40 35 
56 University of Arkansas at Fayetteville 40 33 
56 University of Minnesota-Twin Cities 40 26 
60 Cornell University 38 0 
60 Emory University 38 27 
62 George Washington University 37 32 
62 Georgetown University 37 0 
62 St. Olaf College  37 31 
65 University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa 35 28 
66 Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology 34 24 
67 Clemson University 33 26 
67 Miami University (Ohio) 33 26 
67 University of Central Florida 33 28 
67 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 33 0 
67 University of Virginia 33 0 
72 Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge 32 25 
72 University of Mississippi 32 24 
74 Brandeis University 31 24 
74 Furman University 31 29 
74 University of Miami 31 22 
74 University of Texas at Dallas 31 28 
78 Carnegie Mellon University 29 0 
78 North Carolina State University 29 21 
80 Auburn University 28 20 
80 University of Wisconsin at Madison 28 4 
82 University of Houston 27 25 
83 Williams College  26 0 
84 Amherst College 25 0 
84 University of California at Irvine 25 20 
86 Mississippi State University 24 21 
86 University of Tennessee at Knoxville 24 20 
88 Bowdoin College 23 21 
88 Pomona College 23 6 
88 University of Iowa 23 19 
88 University of Utah 23 17 
88 Washington and Lee University 23 13 
93 Swarthmore College 21 0 
 23
93 University of Rochester 21 18 
93 University of South Florida 21 17 
93 Virginia Tech 21 15 
97 Bowling Green State University 20 18 
97 Calvin College 20 17 
97 Kansas State University 20 12 
97 
Pennsylvania State University at University 
Park 20 5 
97 Trinity University (Tex.) 20 17 
97 University of Richmond 20 12 
97 Whitman College 20 16 
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